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Abstract
The US state of Rhode Island (RI) offers a unique
case for examining the conditions that hinder or
facilitate coastal resilience efforts, due to its small size,
active coastal program, and dynamic engagement of
stakeholders. A five-decade corpus of information on
hazard events, studies, plans and policies, and a
database of more than 40,000 RI Coastal Resource
Management Council (CRMC) permit decisions helps
reveal patterns of decision-making related to coastal
resilience. A social network map traces RI stakeholder
engagement revealing hidden areas of resistance to
resilience policies. Content analysis of documents and
press coverage of decision-making in just one critical
coastal area reveals 71 types of obstacles articulated by
property owners and authorities. Current RI plans and
studies are biased toward public engagement, filling
information gaps, and designing new adaptation
options. Deeper structural, financial and institutional
sources of resistance to resilience remain and continue
to be difficult to address.

1. Introduction
The current environment surrounding coastal
hazards decision making is more complex and presents
more ambiguity than at any time in our recent history.
Politically, there are more players fighting for the ability
to develop fewer coastal properties with ever increasing
regulation on their use. Climatic changes are projected
to impact coasts and coastal societies considerably, in
new ways that have not been experienced by human
societies, presenting an additional layer of complexity
for decision and policy makers, coastal businesses, and
coastal property owners. When faced with uncertain
options, holding on to the status quo as long as possible
is seen as the most viable path forward. Fortunately,
there are numerous places and moments in the US where
the agenda setting process for natural hazards issues
leads to the adoption and implementation of forward
looking policies. We explore the nearly five decades of
experience in the State of Rhode Island to help identify
and understand the enabling conditions that have
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resulted in past and recent important advances in coastal
hazards.
Historically, coastal development design and
construction requirements are focused on preventing
loss of life and ignore the possible range of building
damage states after a disaster and measures of postdisaster usability. Little action is taken to rehabilitate
older structures that are often the most vulnerable to
damage [1]
Coastal states such as Rhode Island are considering
a wide range of possible protective actions, however we
have a limited understanding of how to quantify the
willingness and ability of communities to adopt these
new behaviors in order to adapt to storm hazards. We
continue to struggle to improve the adoption rate of
protective actions by communities. [2, 3, 4]
Decisions to carry out mitigation actions are
complicated, and can depend on a variety of factors
involving individuals or policies. Mundorf et alia note
from a psychological perspective that
“Helping individuals to continue to progress is likely
to continue to increase their support for disaster and
adaptation-related public policies as well. We have
the tools to communicate change, but it takes a
network of change agents and readiness at all levels
to design and disseminate effective messages.” [5]
This contributes to an “adaptation deficit” [6]
whereby threatened communities and other institutional
actors often fail to take an appropriate level of actions to
adapt to climate change threats, including sea level rise
and coastal storm hazards.
Low levels of institutional resilience---“the degree
to which these networks plan for, learn from, and
operate to address threats, build capacity, and act
through coordinative vehicles like planning” ---is a
serious barrier set up by the greater difficulty in
assembling the resources needed to “infuse targeted
assistance to communities and associated stakeholders
beforehand in anticipation of recovery benefits that
remain unmeasured.” [7].
Our research goal is to understand the obstacles,
incentives, and changing perspectives on adaptation to
coastal hazards by property owners and within coastal
areas, focusing on their interactions with public policy
debates regarding coastal resilience. The order-ofmagnitude improvements neded to improve
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preparedness for coastal hazards requires a deeper
understanding of these challenges. A post-Hurricane
Sandy analysis by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
noted that: “…the authors of this report are unaware of
any literature that attempts to quantify the ability of a
community to transform and adapt new functions in
response to a disturbance.” [2]. Our project aimed to
help fill this identified research gap, building on the
barriers to adaptation research by Moser and Ekstrom
[8], Deegan et alia, [9]. Mileti [10] and Birkland [11].
We hypothesize the following to be among the
important barriers to adoption of appropriate mitigating
behaviors: 1) decision-makers lack full understanding of
the threats faced; 2) conflicting incentive structures
create counterproductive behaviors or otherwise impede
coordination among groups; 3) established patterns of
behavior are difficult to overcome; and 4) governance
systems can hamper adoption of policies to improve
resilience.
The coastal state of Rhode Island has one of the
earliest coastal management laws in the US (1971) and
earliest federally approved programs (1979). This
provides more than five decades of planning and
regulatory experience to draw upon in analyzing factors
that contribute to or impede progress.

2. The pursuit of coastal resilience policy in
Rhode Island
The problem, policy and politics streams
surrounding natural hazard impacts and mitigation are
intertwined over time. Burby [12] identifies Rhode
Island as only one of ten states with “both state local
government building code and comprehensive plan
requirements”, thus having among the stronger
governance settings for achieving more resilient
communities and economy. URI researchers and
extension staff have worked with citizens, businesses,
municipal, state, and federal actors for the past halfcentury, trying to overcome resistance and obstacles to
reducing vulnerability to hazards. Such robust planning
and advisory capability itself may not lead to policies
that contribute to overall resilience. Contradictions
abound in attitudes and policy. A case study of
Washington, North Carolina, by Berke et alia [13]
found that the city’s hazards plan made a positive
contribution by seeking to reduce development in the
100 year flood plain, but didn’t incorporate sea level
rise. The city’s community development plans were in
fact aimed at increasing the amount of physical
development in hazardous areas not restricting it.
The Hurricane of 1938 remains the most referred to
storm event for Rhode Island. It is the subject of periodic
retrospectives in the press and the largest flooding
footprint throughout the state from a historical storm.

More recently, Hurricane Carol in 1954 led to the 1957
“Hurricane Survey Interim Report” by the US Army
Corps of Engineers. The Corps proposed a variety of
hurricane barrier configurations for Narragansett Bay.
This plan in turn led to the construction of the Fox Point
Barrier in 1960-1966, very close to the City of
Providence in the headwaters of the Bay and the
rejection of other proposals that would have cut off the
entire bay from the Atlantic Ocean.
Natural hazards policies in RI date to the creation of
the National Flood Insurance Program in 1968, the
Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council
in 1971, the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972, the John Chafee Coastal Barrier Resources Act of
1982, and numerous modifications and reauthorizations
since then. FEMA’s Project Impact and its successors
since 1997 spurred the creation of local multi-hazard
mitigation plans. URI researchers and extension staff
have been active at least since the 1970s in documenting
coastal processes and storm damage. Natural hazards
were also a focus of the original RI Coastal Management
Program document in 1979 and the Salt Ponds Special
Area Management Plan adopted in 1984.
A major concern for planners and researchers
concerned about resilience in Rhode Island is the
absence of recent memory of a major disaster that
affected the entire state and galvanized a major response
similar to Hurricane Carol in 1954. Becker [14] found
the absence of memory to be a major reason for the
effectiveness of recently developed highly detailed
computer simulations such as “Hurricane Rhody”,
which he used to facilitate scenario planning in the Port
of Providence, Rhode Island. “The problem of hurricane
and sea level rise risk for the port of Providence, in
itself, is very difficult to define and bound. Providence
has experience numerous major hurricanes (e.g., 1817,
1885, 1938, and 1954), there has not been such an event
in recent memory. None of the participants witnessed
such a major storm hit the area, though many could
recall hurricanes with far less power.” [14]
We identified 148 coastal storm events affecting
Rhode Island since 1936 including floods, winter storms
and hurricanes that likely generated localized coastal
storm damage leading to private and public investments
in physical shore protection. These storms generate
pockets of continuing damage on top of chronic coastal
erosion along the state’s highly varied 420 mile coast,
making it necessary for coastal managers to focus on
highly localized problem solving and regulatory
solutions.
Our own organization, the Coastal Resources Center
(CRC) based at the Graduate School of Oceanography
of the University of Rhode Island has been involved
throughout its history. Subsequently Project Impact in
the late 1990s led to CRC involvement in preparing
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municipal hazard mitigation plans for the municipalities
of Pawtucket and Narragansett.
In summary, Rhode Island’s experience with coastal
flooding, storms and chronic erosion over the past
eighty years led to substantial institutional reforms of
the type currently recommended by leading experts.
Some have involved large scale construction (the
hurricane barrier protecting the City of Providence) and
many others requiring site specific shore protection
installations and solutions, with increasing preference
given to non-structural approaches. Rhode Island has
depended heavily on scientific studies monitoring and
projecting shoreline change rates and more recently on
sophisticated online services such as STORMTOOLS
(http://www.beachsamp.org/stormtools/) that simulate
likely damage to individual property owner, current and
future risk due to coastal hazards, major hurricanes
through the Hurricane Rhody simulation and dramatic
sea level rise predictions.
In the following sections we examine the lived RI
experience in three ways: looking for patterns in more
than four decades of coastal development decisions
(Section 3.1); mapping and exploring the expanding
policy network for climate and hazard resilience
(Section 3.2); and examining in close detail the content
of resilience and hazard plans, studies, decisions and
debates to reveal how stakeholders describe obstacles
and barriers to attaining more resilient coastal
development (Section 3.3).

3. Documenting coastal resilience policy
implementation
3.1 Insights from the coastal development
permit data base: new versus intensifying uses
The RI CRMC has prepared an evolving series of
studies, policies, and regulations as part of its record of
more than 40,000 permit decisions on development
activities in Rhode Island’s coastal zone. For this
research, the full CRMC permit data base from 1971 to
2016 is compiled and analyzed for the first time to
identify patterns of decision making during post-storm
event recovery as well as implementation of hazard
reduction policies found in both statewide regulations
and special area plans. The searchable permit data
system
is
online
at
http://www.crmcpermitdatabase.org/pads.
One particular area of concern for coastal resilience
in Rhode Island are its commercial waterfronts.
Providence Harbor, Newport Harbor and Wickford
Cove, important commercial and recreation ports, have
been the focus of numerous vulnerability studies and
adaptation planning since the beginning of the 2000s.

There are ten types of permit decisions issued by the
CRMC and its regulatory staff. Six of these lead to
actual construction projects including administrative or
routine projects that easily conform to CRMC standards,
more complex projects which are reviewed and
approved by full CRMC; applications for maintaining
an existing structure; fresh water wetlands permits;
projects related to ice damage, and a special set of
permits issued to allow rapid repairs to storm damage
from Hurricane Sandy in 2012.
The CRMC has placed a great deal of emphasis in
recent years on providing early guidance and advice to
applicants for coastal development. However, in the
following analyses, only permits issued for actual
development projects are included in order to reflect
actual decisions and construction. This includes 28,203
permit decisions that relate to projects that are
implemented.

Figure 1 Annual comparison of CRMC assents
that allow NEW USES on a coastal site (red line)
compared to projects that maintain or rehabilitate
(REHAB) existing development on coastal sites
(blue line). Does not include preliminary
determinations nor findings of no impact.
In addition to administrative categories the CRMC
tracks permits by development activity type. There are
92 of these. In the 1980s new housing development
dominated the attention of regulators. From a peak of
144 new units per year in the 1980s, the CRMC only
approved 41 new homes on the coast in 2016. In recent
decades the majority of CRMC housing decisions
involve the rehabilitation or maintenance of existing
buildings. An index to track these two trends is shown
in Figure 1. The “REHABs existing use” trendline is
composed of 15 permit activity types that involve
rehabilitating or rebuilding coastal structures. The
”NEW USES on sites” trend-line combines 17 activity
types that involve new construction and coastal
modification.
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NEW USES of the coast include new houses with
onsite septic systems, new houses connected to sewers
and houses with substantial alterations.
Quite simply, there are very few new development
projects upon which to apply the increasingly
progressive and protective policies and regulations in
the Rhode Island coastal management program. In stark
contrast, applications for REHAB projects that upgrade
existing properties increased dramatically in the mid2000s and now dominate the CRMC’s decision making
workload. This growing intensification of the use of
existing structures and property within alreadydeveloped coastal areas suggests that existing property
owners, as well as prospective purchasers of existing
shorefront homes are not retreating from the shore. The
REHABilitation type projects in coastal sites are not
subject to the most stringent regulations for elevation
above base flood elevation as long as the proposed
modifications to structures are less than 50 per cent.

3.2 Shore protection and management
decisions: geographic distribution of decisions.
There are four development activity types directly
related to shoreline erosion, sea level rise and flooding
from storms. Between 1971 and 2016, the CRMC issued
2,882 permits in these categories, as shown in Table 1.
We georeferenced the entire CRMC permit data base
using ArcGIS 10.1 with the aid of the ArcGIS Maps
add-in for Excel.
Table 1 Shore protection decisions 1971 to 2016
(Total = 2,882)

Matunuck
Village
Figure 2 Location of clusters of shore protection
permits on RI’s south shore, highlighting
Matunuck Village.
desire to stay in hazardous shore areas. Small et alia [15]
used a Coastal Environmental Risk Index (CERI) to
analyze Matunuck Village (Figure 2), located adjacent
to local and state operated public beaches. In recent
years the village has become a hot spot for contentious
shore protection decisions. (See Section 6). Small and
his colleagues estimated damage to the 708 existing
structures simulating a 100 year storm event with and
without predicted sea level rise [15]. They found that
“approximately 35% of the one and two story
structures…are expected to be damaged from a 100 year
storm event with no sea level rise…However, only 12%
of these structures are estimated to be damaged more
than 50%.” Since 50% damage represents a critical
threshold, very few property owners would have to
rebuild to stringent standards. A significant degree of
resistance to adopting resilience in coastal development
is baked into the nature of coastal development patterns
and existing policy affecting the state’s 420 miles of
coastline.

Shoreline Protection Facilities/Repair
Beach Nourishment/ Conservation
Restoration
Shoreline Protection Facilities/New

1556
767
504

3.3 Shore protection and management
decisions: trends over time.

Shoreline Protection (Non-Structural)

55

In the 1970s more than half of the projects approved
by the CRMC were for new hard shoreline protection
facilities. With the adoption of the revised “Red Book”
regulatory program document in 1983 beach
nourishment and conservation became far more
important. Since 2010 only 30 hardened shoreline
projects have been approved. Repair to existing shore
protection structures, 365 since 2010, continues to be
allowed and accounts for about 40% of the total of
current CRMC decisions. Non-structural shoreline
protection is being tested but remains a very small
portion of applications to the CRMC. There have been
just 23 such projects since 2010.
Figure 3 shows the steady decline in approved
applications for new houses in the high hazard defined
here as the overwash zone of the Hurricane of 1938.

An index using the four shore management and
protection decisions was mapped this using the cluster
analysis routine available through ArcGIS online. The
result is shown in in Figure 2.
Each of these clusters of intense, continuous
decision-making along the Rhode Island south shore
have unique geomorphology, coastal development
characteristics and patterns of exposure to erosion,
waves, wind and storms. Ironically, forecasts of future
damage to coastal property in high hazard areas suggest
that current policies may actually prompt property
owners to make minimal repairs and reinforce their
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Structures and CRMC permits in
Hurricane of 1938 overwash zone
structures in e911 database
Hurricane of 1938 overwash zone
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Figure 3 Declining trends in CRMC assents
issued for new or altered dwellings in the high
hazard zone as defined by the overwash area of
the Hurricane of 1938.
In 2016 the CRMC approved only 4 new dwellings
connected to municipal sewer service, 14 using onsite
waste disposal, and 48 structures undergoing major
alterations in the high hazard zone as defined by the
Hurricane of 1938 overwash zone. This is a tiny
proportion of the 4,991 dwellings and shore protection
projects already approved in the hazardous overwash
zone, and 13,952 structures presently located there.
Figure 4 shows a segment of the Matunuck coastline
illustrating structures now located in the high hazard
zone (green shading) and the CRMC permits issued for
new houses as well as shore protection projects within
that zone.

4. Recent coastal resilience policy and
planning: opportunities for progress.
Two years after Hurricane Sandy generated
substantial damage to the South Shore and segments of
Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island initiated several major
studies, plans, data and tools including: the Rhode
Island Hazard Mitigation Plan 2014 Update [16]; the
inauguration of the RI Shoreline Change Special Area
Management Plan [4]; the initiation of work on
STORMTOOLS [17]; and the establishment of the
Rhode Island Climate Change Coordinating Council.
Post-Hurricane Sandy funding along with resources
from Rhode Island Sea Grant and Rhode Island state
agencies has helped support these efforts. This period
also represents a transition in approaches to public
engagement. The 2014 Update to the Hazard Mitigation
Plan led by the RI Emergency Management Agency
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Figure 4 Matunuck Village structures within high
hazard zone (overwash from Hurricane of 1938)
Notes: Coastal development since 1971 is largely
within the zone of impact of the storm surge from the
Hurricane of 1938 (yellow). Shore protection actions
were sought by 120 individuals and businesses who
carried out 211 projects (pink circle ) in the village
area. Many new and altered dwellings have been
permitted within the Hurricane overwash zone by the
CRMC, within its narrow 200 foot primary jurisdiction
(blue stars  and, green ).

(RIEMA) received written comments from only 13
individuals, mainly representing government agencies.
RIEMA relied upon an online survey questionnaire that
yielded only 70 responses, also principally from
government officials. [16, p. 22].
In sharp contrast, the 2018 RI Shoreline Change
Special Area Management Plan (Beach SAMP) [4] led
by the CRMC engaged upwards of 1000 individuals in
more than 30 public events, as well as made active use
of an interactive website to keep the public informed
about
the
years-long
planning
process
(http://www.beachsamp.org/). Participants included
property owners as well as those representing
organizations,
businesses,
and
neighborhood
associations, as well as educational institutions,
professional associations and other groups not captured
in the Update. This intensely process-oriented approach
has been a characteristic of Rhode Island coastal
management since its inception, but also strongly
supported by the work of Moser and Ekstrom analyzing
lessons from San Francisco Bay experience. [18]. Yet
there may be a participation divide acting as a barrier to
adaptation. We explore this in Section 5.
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Figure 5 Social network analysis showing stratification and weak ties between the state level climate
change and hazards actors (upper tier), stakeholders engaged in the RI Shoreline Change Special Area
Management Plan (middle tier) and CRMC permit recipients for shore protection and new coastal
dwellings state-wide (lower clusters)
Notes: The red dots in the sociogram represent individuals, while colored squares identify the meetings, reports,
events and types of permits that individuals are affiliated with.

5. The participation divide: a structural
obstacle to stakeholder engagement and
adoption of policy innovations
Is Rhode Island’s high level of public engagement
actually reaching and influencing all those who are
actually facing difficult current and future decisions
regarding their homes and businesses located in high
hazard areas?
We identified individuals involved in recent public
events primarily in the present decade related to
natural hazards and climate change, including publicly
posted meeting minutes, reports, plans and other
publications, attendance lists at Beach SAMP and
other public meetings and workshops as well as the
individuals holding coastal permits for shore
protection and new homes.
The method of social network analysis we used to
represent relationships is referred to as affiliation
network or two-mode analysis. [19] It is based on the
idea that individuals who meet or are involved in an
‘event’, such as a meeting, project, document, online
meeting, and so on, have some kind of relationship.
We combined this information with data from
documents, news coverage and coastal development
permit applicants statewide. The resulting socio-gram

shown in Figure 5 includes 3833 individuals tied
together by 57 events, 88 organizations as well as 4562
shore management and dwelling permits. (Individuals
often are tied to multiple permit decisions.)
One surprise in this analysis is the apparent divide,
between the individuals identified who are engaged in
policy and planning activities on a regular basis; those
who participated in the 2018 Beach SAMP; and those
are actually living along the shore and hold permits.
Actors engaged in ongoing resilience policy
debates as identified through documents, event
participation and responsible organizations, form the
top layer of the network. The Beach SAMP process
included a series of 30 events held around the state
from 2015 to 2018, engaged many of those already
involved brought in hundreds of new people as well.
However, very few of the individuals holding permits
for shore protection or new development could be
determined to have participated in the Beach SAMP
process or otherwise engaged in meetings related to
coastal and natural hazards resilience by other state
and municipal entities. For example, only nine
individuals, businesses and organizations with
shoreline protection type permits from the CRMC in
the hotly debated Matunuck situation are mentioned in
the decades of news coverage of how the village is
coping with coastal hazards. None of these local
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entities and actors appeared to be at all engaged in
state-level policy and planning efforts.
One important group acting as a link between
planning efforts and actual experience with shore
protection and coastal development are coastal
municipal governments. Cities and towns are
struggling to determine how to maintain public
infrastructure and recreational facilities in the face of
sea level rise, erosion and a future major hurricane
disaster, along with balancing conflicting priorities of
maintaining public safety and promoting coastal
development and maintaining an adequate tax base.
Another key group is largely hidden in this
analysis: the dozens of builders, financers, legal,
architectural and engineering consultants who
frequently attend planning meetings and act in the
background as key intermediaries between regulators,
planners and property owners. More needs to done to
understand the views and roles played by this group.

6. A Century of coastal change and conflict
in Matunuck Beach: an approach to
understanding stakeholder views on
resilience.
Matunuck has been the locus of coastal
management challenges and controversies since the
1970s, but more importantly has been a unique
community and summer colony since the mid-1800s.
The 2015 Matunuck Village Plan Prepared by Horsley
Witten Group [20] sets out a detailed portrayal of its
enduring value as a place for recreation, vacation
homes and permanent residences. The social and
recreational aspects of Matunuck are usually the focus
for the seaside village, but the natural features that
shape the landscape and provide habitat are also
integral to the experience of Matunuck. Most recently,
larger forces have become the center of attention as
ocean currents and storms are reshaping Matunuck in
dramatic ways. [20, p. 6].
According to the recently completed Shoreline
Change Special Area Management Plan (SAMP)
adopted by the Rhode Island Coastal Resources
Management Council, the Matunuck Headland area is
one of the most at risk in the state to the combined
effects of storm surge, sea level rise and coastal
erosion. An evaluation of historic shoreline change
revealed a very high rate of erosion along a stretch of
Matunuck from Cards Pond to the east end of South
Kingstown Town Beach, with losses up to 1.4
meters/year. [4, Chapter 4, p. 52]
We compiled several dozen reports, plans and
published studies, along with several hundred
newspaper articles from 1983 to 2017 obtained using

the simple search string “Matunuck AND erosion OR
flooding”. In addition, the full text of the Providence
Journal and other Rhode Island based newspapers was
searched and relevant articles downloaded.
We then used content analysis software, AtlasTi,
to explore how all those who have written about or
whose concerns and views have been documented
view and express in their own terms the opportunities
and obstacles carry out the content analysis.
An initial vocabulary of key terms and concepts
was augmented by free coding as items were reviewed.
This effort yielded 71 codes for quotes related to
obstacles to adaptation, an equal number of codes
covering adaptation responses, and 29 distinct codes
for opportunities to adapt. Frequently mentioned
obstacles, opportunities and action responses can be
summarized as follows, in decreasing frequency of
occurrence:
OBSTACLES
 Mismatch between impact causes and
availability of effective solutions.
 Low comprehension of risk by property owners.
 Intense interest in extending the use of property
in hazardous areas as long as possible.
 Strength of efforts to protect property and
business investments.
 High cost of more effective solutions.
 Safety fears prompting urgent demands for quick
action.
OPPORTUNITIES
 Ongoing state/ federal planning, zoning,
regulation process.
 Public meeting or hearing.
 Coordination & capacity for funding.
 Collaboration between private and government
stakeholders.
 Congruence between nature of problem and most
effective solutions.
 Educate private and public sector stakeholders.
RESILIENCE RESPONSES:
 Shoreline protection (sea wall, sheet pile).
 Relocation of structures or activities.
 Proposed hazard policies and regulations.
 Temporary sand bags, fencing, wooden walls,
burritos (fabric tubes).
 Beach nourishment (with material trucked in
from outside).
 Beach nourishment related to local channel
dredging projects.
Researchers, planners, regulators and stakeholders
do not speak in “obstacles and opportunities”
language. Our free coding rarely used actual phrases
from stakeholders. For example, at a public hearing in
April 2011, state and local officials met with a
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“roomful of disgruntled residents” to address the
burgeoning conflicts over the degree of shore
protection that should be allowed in a short section of
Matunuck Beach road. [21]
The director of the State Coastal Resources
Management Council stated that:
“…if he gives Matunuck what it wants, what
does he say to other owners of shoreline
properties who want to build sea walls? Hardened
structures block the flow of sand and often cause
more erosion of adjoining beaches.”
“Kevin Finnegan of the Ocean Mist said much
of the shoreline from Town Beach to East
Matunuck State Beach is already hardened. The
state should just finish the job, he said, or let
property owners do it.
“Let me, Fran and the other property owners
protect your road, said Finnegan, to big applause.”
“South Kingstown manager Stephen Alfred
said “only 65 feet of land remain between the
ocean and Matunuck Beach Road. To me, we’ve
got to look at how to protect the village and
existing businesses. The longer we say we don t
know how we’re going to do it, the options
become less and less. I haven’t heard of other
areas in Rhode Island where businesses are about
to fall into the drink. “
“Fran O’Brien of Tara’s Joyce Family Pub said
he wasn’t asking for taxpayer help, he just wanted
permission to protect his own property.”
In coding these passages from the article we found
at least eight distinct obstacles facing the decisionmaking conflict in Matunuck:
 need to demonstrate a public purpose for a hazard
mitigation project.
 need for equitable resolution of conflicts.
 interest in extending the use of property in
hazardous areas as long as possible.
 political pressure on decision makers.
 interest in protecting property, businesses and
investments.
 safety fears leading to calls for quick action.
 limited availability of relocation sites.
 pressure to relax protective rules.
Although Matunuck stakeholders---including a
town official---expressed the view that they are
uniquely singled out for push-back from state
authorities, no one is clamoring for more scientific
information about whether there is a problem, rather
the focus is on the decision time-horizon and the
willingness by property owners to accept short to
medium range actions.
There are many more connections and dynamics
among the obstacles, opportunities and responses, but

our aim here is to show broader ideas and patterns. The
full set of obstacles, opportunities and responses can
be arrayed around six broad categories: Process,
Knowledge & Attitudes, Situational Factors, Money &
Finance, Actions and Policy. The specific quotes
captured for Matunuck cover the full range of drama,
frustration and doubt raised each time a major storm
event causes damage and concern in the community.
In contrast, most public documents such as plans and
studies shy away from a discussion of obstacles and
focus on Knowledge, Action, and Process variables.
The Shoreline Special Area Plan document is rich and
thorough in its scientific treatment of Matunuck and
other high priority segments of the shore, as well as
detailed in its recommendations on adaptation actions.
Yet the new plan is also constrained in its approach:
“The guidance offered by this Shoreline Change
SAMP is primarily for applicants seeking coastal
permits from CRMC. CRMC is proposing a
requirement that coastal permit applicants complete
a five-step risk assessment process for proposed
developments within CRMC’s jurisdiction as part of
the permit application. [4]
The audience for the new SAMP includes decision
makers, planners, boards and commissions in Rhode
Island’s 21 coastal communities who are principally
responsible for coping with the impacts of storms,
coastal erosion, and sea level rise outside of CRMC’s
jurisdiction. The SAMP is also intended to aid other
state and federal agencies responsible for coastal
resources, assets and property in Rhode Island in
future planning and decision making. [4]
However, the continuing depth of conflict and
resistance to some of Rhode Island’s resilience
measures produced a surprising policy result in mid2018 after the Beach SAMP was adopted. The RI
General Assembly sided with environmentalists, the
CRMC and builders---against staunch opposition of
municipalities---to allow developers to measure
maximum building height from the base flood
elevation rather than ground level, creating much
higher structures that will be resilient to flooding and
storm surge but also leading to “plenty of uproar when
building permits are pulled and neighbors see the size
of beachfront homes to be built.” [22] Even if current
trends show a relatively low rate of new shorefront
development within the Hurricane of ’38 overwash
zone, this policy could offer a strong incentive for
wealthy property owners to acquire and demolish even
more vulnerable structures and replace them with
“McMansions” that meet legal requirements but block
views, possibly lower property values in surrounding
shore-side neighborhoods and increase the number of
structures overall that are exposed to hazards.
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7. Summary
Numerous obstacles, opportunities and responses
to climate and hazard resilience are present in Rhode
Island, a coastal state without recent experience in
responding to the type of major disaster represented by
Hurricane Katrina, Matthew, Harvey, Maria,
Matthew, Sandy and Florence. Rhode Island
researchers and planners remain concerned about
raising the level of public understanding of the
combined effects of a historic level hurricane
combined sea level rise and chronic coastal erosion as
threats to coastal development and ecosystems. They
are producing new information and approaches to
visualization and conducting active stakeholder
engagement and planning processes to create better
policy and motivate coastal property owner and
community response.
We employed three approaches to understand
obstacles to and opportunities for resilience actions
beyond the standard concerns about lack of knowledge
and low comprehension of risk.
Our examination of coastal regulatory decisions
indicates that there are dozens of segments or reaches
of the RI coast where homeowners and businesses
continue to struggle to maintain their properties in the
face of localized threats from periodic storms, chronic
erosion and rising sea level. Matunuck Beach is one of
the most contentious of these locations and became a
focus of our attention. The steady decline in requests
for new housing construction or hardened shoreline
protection on the shore has been replaced by property
owners remodeling or rehabilitating older properties to
extend their usable life in the face of hazards. Now
they have the added incentive of being able to raise
these old structures above flood elevation without
violating local zoning ordinances. Neither education,
online mapping tools, frightening scenarios nor the
potential of loss of access to flood insurance may not
deter this group from causing a surge in coastal
development.
Our assembly of social network data confirms
that Rhode Island’s recent effort to create a new set of
guidelines for vulnerable areas, the Beach SAMP,
succeeded in expanding stakeholder awareness and
engagement in resilience planning, particularly among
municipal authorities. However, state planning efforts
are not reaching the far greater number of individuals
and businesses already located in the shore, possessing
shore protection permits and continuing to facing
chronic property damage. The efforts may not be
reaching those who are rehabilitating or seeking to
construct new homes in the most vulnerable areas.
Hidden from view in the present analysis are the
highly influential group of builders, financers and
consultants who work with property owners to

navigate the evolving universe of information, plans,
regulations and characteristics of hazardous coastal
sites to meet their clients’ expectations. Evidence of
their broader influence on RI resilience policy
emerged in the surprise adoption in July 2018 of the
dramatic change to measuring base elevation of
properties in coastal areas to allow elevation of coastal
structures to proceed more rapidly.
Our analysis of the content of documents and
press reports on coastal hazards, focusing on the
continuing conflict in Matunuck Village, indicates that
the plain language that is used by stakeholders to
express frustration and even resistance to resilience
initiatives is not readily captured in any of the
analytical schemes used by resilience researchers,
including our own. Coastal property owners and
public officials facing damage to public infrastructure
have a broad range of concerns and sometimes
conflicting goals that lie well beyond the need for
better understanding that needs to be remedied by yet
more scientific and site based information or by
improvements in the planning and stakeholder
engagement process. Those who are determined to
protect their shorefront investments argue for an
unconstrained right to do so while those with ample
funds and a determination to remain or locate in the
coast want clear rules to comply with, however
expensive.
Coastal residents and business owners who are
willing to retreat or relocate after a major storm or in
the face of chronic impacts, are still searching---so far
in vain---for acceptable, feasible, and affordable
alternatives while they still have time to act.
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